When speaking about secure networks, the bootstrapping process is very often forgotten or at least ignored. Some of the methods used so far do not protect against impersonation (Diffie-Hellman exponential key exchange) or have an important computational complexity (public-key based methods). A new algorithm is presented which is able to achieve key exchange whilst ensuring secrecy and authentication with a reasonable amount of computation.
1.

INITIALIZATION
Let us define the necessary conditions for our system. q, Q are a large prime (say 150 digits), with q-l having at least one large prime factor, and a primitive element of Z/(q) I respectively, both publicly known. To generate the public information listed in the previous paragraph, we can proceed as follows. A particular node i (it is only important that it be a single node, no matter which one), generates a, q and sends them over the Merkle channel, so that everybody can reliably learn these numbers. Then each node i generates a number ti in the range 2..q-1 and keeps it secret; then node i computes its name as ati mod q and sends it over the Merkle channel. Now every node knows a, q and each other's name. The probability for all nodes to have different names is where n is the number of nodes, P denotes permutations and PR permutations with repetition. It is trivial to see that this quantity approaches 1 if q >> n2.
. THE METHOD. NORMAL MODE: KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
In what we call "normal mode", the presented method works as a key exchange p r o t o c o l , providing secrecy and a u t h e n t i c a t i o n . After this mode has been used, the exchanged key can be used by this method in order either to encrypt and to decrypt messages, or to sign them, if some public parameters are added to those discussed in the previous section. Let us examine the "normal mode".
Node j first has a, q and knows all the node identifiers, in particular knows the identifier of node i, from which it wants to get a key, to be IDi = ati mod q . of course, ti is only known to node i. Then node j and i proceed as follows: STEP 1. NODE j: Compute X1, such that gcd(X1,q-1) = 1 and 2 <= Xi <= 9-2 Compute also Y1 = ax' mod q . X2 + X 4 = ti mod (q-1) and 2 <= X2, X4 <= 9-2
Compute the key K = ax' mod q .
Compute Y2 = Ylx2 mod q. Compute Y4 = Ylx4 mod q. Send Y2 and Y4 to NODE j . In order to achieve authentication, NODE j performs the following test on K (if equation [5] does not hold, then the key K does not come from NODE i):
END.
NOW NODE i and NODE j share the key X which can be used either straightforwardly as a D E S key (taking for example the 8 lower bytes of it), or act as a key-encrypting key to transmit further keys, or be used as a key for the cryptosystem alternate mode of the presented method.
Note that some calculations can be done in parallel between NODE i and NODE j . For instance, NODE i can precalculate some (X2, X4) pairs for the next key transmissions to other nodes and can also precalculate the keys K it will send, in order to accelerate step 2. Also, while waiting for Y2, NODE j can compute Xl-', so that step 3 is faster. A precalculation of some ( X I , XI-1, YI) triples is also possible at node j . With all these improvements, only four interactive exponentiations are necessary:
-To compute Y2 at node i.
-To compute Y4 at node i.
-To retrieve K at node j .
-To retrieve ax4 mod q at node j . This is equivalent to the four exponentiations required to ensure secrecy and authentication with RSA (two at NODE i and two at NODE j to retrieve the key), but it avoids the strong prime calculation (two strong primes per node).
. F I N A L REMARKS
Proofs of correctness, secrecy and authentication, as well as some extensions to the basic algorithm will be given in the full paper. It will be shown that this algorithm can work in an alternate mode, thus operating as a unidirectional conventional or as a signature scheme.
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